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PROBLEMS  OF  SOCIAL  SECURITY 
- AREAS  OF  COMMON  INTEREST  -
The  objective  of  the  Communication  transmitted  by  the 
Commission  to the  Council  at  the  end  of  1982  (1)  was  to extend 
to  the  Community  sphere  the discussion already  underway  in  the 
Member  States  concerning  the whole  range  of  problems  which  national 
social  security schemes  are  facing  as  a  result  of  the  recession, 
the  new  needs  which  the  latter has  created  <e.g.  the  "new  poor")  and 
the  influence of  a  number  of  structural  trends  <e.g.  the  ageing 
population).  Judging  by  the  many  different  events  and  activities 
triggered off by  this  Communication,  both  at  national  and  Community 
level,  the  Commission  has  been  Largely  successful  in  its aims. 
In  1983  round-table  discussions  were  held  in  every  Member 
State,  at  which  participants were  asked  to give  their opinions  on  the 
Communication  and  decide  to what  extent  it  represented  the  situation 
in their  respective  country.  These  debates  revealed  considerable 
differences of  opinion  ,  depending  on  the  extent  to which  each 
country  had  achieved  its social  protection objectives.  Thus  it was 
found  that  although  the  problems  were  broadly  similar  in all Member 
States  the degree  of  urgency  and  seriousness  was  not.  Certain 
countries  <Ireland  and  Greece)  have  been  hampered  in their efforts to 
catch  up  - in  terms  of  the  volume  and  level  of  benefits  - with  the 
richer  Member  States.  The  recent  enlargement  of  the  Community  will 
only  aggravate  this  imbalance  and  stimulate demands  for  the  narrowing 
of  the  socio-economic  gap. 
.I. 
(1)  COMC82)716  final  of  17  November  1982 - 2  -
The  above  Communicationr  moreover  r  served  as  the 
central  document  for  a  meeting  - the  first  since  the  Community  was 
set  up  - of  Ministers  responsible  for  social  security,  in  November  1983 
in  Athens.  A second  meeting  was  held  in  April  1984  in  Paris.  Although 
informal,  these  meetings  revealed  a  number  of  common  concerns  {e.g. 
the  need  for  finance),  as  well  as  more  recent  preoccupations  (the 
implications  of  current  demographic  trends),  which  were  reflected  in 
the  Council•s  conclusions of  22  June  1984,  which  in  turn  were  taken 
up  by  the  European  Council  meeting  on  25  and  26  June  1984  (1). 
Finally,  a  majority of  member  countries  stated their 
opposition  to  the  principle of  h~rmonizi~ the  current  social  security 
schemes  <  2) • 
The  principal  views  contained  in  the  Commission•s  1982 
Communication  and  the  objectives  it puts  before  the  Member  States 
(i.e.  controlling  the  growth  of  social  expenditure,  reassessment  of  financing 
systems,  increasing  the  social  effectiveness  of  social  security schemes) 
remain  valid  today,  even  if governments  have  introduced  additional and  toUJher 
measures  since  then  to  deal  with  the  problems  <mainly  of  a  financial  and 
budgetary  nature)  currently affecting  social  security schemes,  and  a 
weaker  trend  is beginning  to  be  seen  in  the  progress of  social 
expenditure  (3). 
The  European  Parliament  adopted  a  Resolution  (4)  relating 
to this  Communication  in  May  1984,  while  the ESC  issued an  opinion 
in  October  of  the  same  year  (5). 
The  OECD  and  the  Council  of  Europe,  meanwhile,  have  been 
spending  an  increasing part  of  their  time  discussing  the  same  problems. 
A conference  of  Council  of  Europe  Ministers  responsible  for  social 
security  was  held  in  Athens  in October  1985  on  the  theme  of  s6cial 
security  in difficult economic  times. 
As  the  economic  situation  continues  to  be  unfavourable  the 
debate  must  continue,  particularly since,  in  the  absence  of  concertation, 
the  Member  States are  tempted  to bolster  the  competitiveness of  their 
economies  by  cutting back  on  social  expenditure  - particularly social 
security expenditure.  This  discussion  should  help  to  pave  the  way  for 
the  adaptation of  social protection schemes  to  new  economic,  social  and 
demographic  trends  and  the  situation  likely  to  result  from  the 
.1. 
·(1)  Extracts  from  these  conclusions  are attached  (OJ  4-7-84  No.  C 175> 
(2)  This  (controversial)  aspect  will  be  dealt  with  in greater details 
towards  the  end  of this  report. 
(3)  Figures  in  appendix 
(4)  European  Parliament  Resolution of 22  May  1984 
(5)  ESC  opinion of 25  Octob~r 1984 - 3  -
completion  of  the  internal  market.  In  the  circumstances,  however, 
it is essential  to widen  the  scope  of the  debate,not  only to  consider  aspects 
of  social  policy  but  also  to  include  economic 
policy  in  general.  Now  that  Europe  has  entered  a  new  phase  of  struc-
tural  change,  this discussion  should  help to prepare  the  ground  for 
parallel  changes  in  economic  and  social  structures. 
The  discussion of  the  1982  memorandum  has  enabled  the different 
Community  Institutions  to  identify a  certain number  of  problem  areas  of 
common  interest.  The  Commission  has  selected three,  which  it believes  to 
be  of  particular significance  for  a  new  and  more  detailed exchange  of 
views.  These  problemsare closely  linked  and  therefore  require  a  comprehensive 
response.  They  are  the  problems  underlying  the  financing  of  current  or 
projected  needs  in  terms  of  social  protection expenditure,  the  implications 
of  demographic  trends,  and  the  worsening  problem  of  "marginalization" 
(the  new  poor)  which  is affecting or  threatening  a  considerable  number  of 
people  in  the  Member  States.  In  the  following  chapters  each  of  these 
problems  is  analysed  individually.  The  Commission  has  added  a  chapter 
containing  a  number  of  proposals.  Final  comments  are  included  in  the 
last  chapter,  in  which  a  number  of  points  raised  in  the  introduction  to 
this  Communication  are  developed  in  relation to economic  and  social 
change. 
0 
0  0 
I.  FINANCING  PROBLEMS 
As  has  been  demonstrated  on  a  number  of  occasions  (1),  social 
security  schemes  have  been  under  pressure  from  two  quarters  :  the  increase 
in  expenditure  resulting  from  per~istent high-level  unemployment,  and 
changing  demographic  structures, which  are  already  increasing  the pressure 
on  the  old-age  and  sickness  insurance  sectors.  The  flow  of  incoming  revenue, 
meanwhile,  has  been  slowing  down. 
.I. 
(1)  Notably  in  the  first  Commission  Memorandum  Doc.  COM<82)716  final. 8 
1970  36.5 
1980  44.6 
1981  45.3 
1982  47.0 
1983  46.1 
1984  46.6 
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In  spite of  steps  taken  to  curb  the  growth  in  expenditure 
and  the  results obtained,  the public  authorities  were  unable  for  a  Long 
time  to  restore  the  system  to financial  equilibrium,  forcing  them  to. 
impose  higher  Levies  (in  the  form  of  social  charges  or  taxes).  This 
situation is  reflected  in  table  1  below,  which  shows  the  total of 
compulsory  levies, up  to  two-thirds  of  which  is  used  for 
financing  social  protection. 
Table  1  :  Current  public  revenue  as  a  percentage  of  GOP  (1) 
OK  D  GR  F  IRL  I  L  NL 
46.2  38.9  26.5  39.8  - 30.7  36.4  44.8 
52.9  45.3  30.2  46.6  38.4  37.7  52.7  53.6 
52.9  45.4  29.0  47.4  39.4  39.6  54.3  53.8 
51.6  46.0  31 .2  48.3  41.6  42.2  55.7  54.2 
54.1  45.9  31.9  48.9  42.5  45.1  58.1  56.6 
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It  is  clear  that  the order  of  magnitude  now  reached  - nearly  50  % 
in  most  countries  - cannot  but  seriously affect  the  economy  as  a  whole. 
Social  charges  which  many  people  consider  to  be  excessive  may  be 
prejudicial  to  economic  activity as  a  whole,  or  increase  the  temptation 
to  resort  to  the  "black"  economy. 
However,  not  only  the  amounts  of  compulsory  social  charges  are  being 
criticized, but  also - and  especially - the  way  in  which  these  charges 
are  levied. 
In  most  Member  States,  social  security  contributions  are  calculated 
and  paid on  the  basis  of  wages  received.  This  automatically  Leads  to 
higher  labour  costs,  which  some  people believe  to be  one  of  the  reasons 
for  the  high  level  of  unemployment  today. 
(1)  Source  :  SOEC 
(2)  National  data. 
.I. Employers' 
contributions 
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This  is  why  in  some  of  the  countries  concerned  there  is  increasing 
pressure  for  a  general  review  of  the  way  in  which  the  system  is  financed, 
although  a  consistent  strategy for  finding  alternative ways  of  raising 
money  has  so  far  proved  to  be  elusive. 
We  shall  now  examine  ways  in  which  the  system  can  be  changed,  at 
least  in  theory,  and  what  the  implications  are. 
a.  The  relative  importance  of  taxes  and  contributions  as  sources 
of  finance 
The  relative weight  given  to contributions  and  taxes  as  sources  of 
finance  varies  considerably,  not  only  from  one  country  to another,  but 
also between  the  various  branches  of  social  security.  For  1983  the 
figures  can  be  broken  down  as  follows  : 
Table  2  :  Financing  of  social  security  in 1983  by  source  of  revenue  (%) 
8  DK  D  FR  IRL  GR  IT  L  NL  UK 
32.9  10.9  40.2  52.8  23.0  24.2  53.3  33.1  31.1  31.8 
Insured persons'  16.8  3.7  29.6  23.6  12.5  25.0  13.9  25.6  36.8  15.9 
contributions 
Public  subsidies  39.8  81.5  26.8  20.6  63.3  45.8  30.6  32.8  18.6 
Other  revenue  4.2  4.8  3.4  3.1  1.2  5.0  2.2  8.5  13.5 
100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
SPAIN  1983  Employers'  and  workers'  contributions 
Public  subsidies  : 
76.8 
22 
Other  :  1. 2 
<These  data  are  not  comparable  with those  of  other  Member  States  as 
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A striking feature  is the difference  between  the  share  represented 
by  public  subsidies  in  the  Netherlands  and  Denmark  <respectively 18.6  and 
81.5% of  overall  revenue).  These  figures  refer  to national  averages, 
so  differences  between  the  various  sectors  of  the  social  security schemes 
may  be  even  greater. 
It  is  impossible  to prove  the  existence of  a  permanent 
and  clear  link  between  a  type of  benefit  and  the  way  in  which  it is 
fi~anced (e.g.  the  financing  from  tax  revenue  of  benefits  enjoyed  equally 
by  all citizens,  such  as  sickness  benefit,  flat-rate old  age  pensions, 
etc.; or,  on  the  other  hand,  contribution-based  for  benefits  the  level 
of  which  depends  on  the  contribution  record  (unemployment  benefits), 
which  are  available  to a  limited number  of  people). 
In  fact,  the  structure  of  financing  in  each  country  described  here  is 
perhaps  less  the  result  of  logical  decisions  than  of  the  historical  background 
in each  case. 
b.  Earnings-related contributions  vs  contributions  linked  to  value 
added/direct/indirect  taxation 
Since  they  add  to  wage  costs,  social  security  contributions,  which 
are  at  present  generally earnings-related,increase  the  cost  of  labour 
in the production  system.  But  if that  is so,  what  can  we  put  in  their 
place  ?  Should  we  replace  them  by  contributions  linked  to value  added, 
provided  the  product  remains  unchanged,  or  should  financing  be  obta1ned 
from  direct or  indirect  taxation  ? 
There  are  a  number  of different  possibilities,  some  of  which  are 
discussed  below  by  way  of  example  <1) 
- calculating  contributions  on  the basis  of 
•  gross  added  value 
•  net  added  value 
•  gross  aggregate  wages  plus  amortization 
- increasing  income  tax 
- increasing  VAT. 
The  assessment  of  these  possibilities depends  on  their assumed 
effects. 
.1. 
(1)  Other  possibilities  have  been  suggested,  such  as  abolishing  the  ceiling 
on  contributions,  and  introducing  a  lower  limit  or  exemptions,  the 
possible effect of  which  on  employment  have  been  set  out  in  a  study 
carried out  on  behalf  of  the  Commission  :  Financing  of social  security 
and  employment  - Doc.  V/42/83  - Brussels  1983. - 7  -
c.  The  effect  on  employment 
The  effect  on  employment  must  be  studied first.  We  should 
therefore  consider  which  of  the  above  alternatives will  have  the 
greatest effect  on  the  Labour  market  (1),  without  restricting ourselves 
to  studying the direct  (positive)  effect  of  the  relative  reduction  in 
the  cost  of  labour  and  the  relative  increase  in  the  cost  of  capital. 
In  the  case  of  contributions  linked· to  value  added,  for  instance, 
contrary trends  may  appear  in  the  medium  term  due  to  the  negative effect 
on  technical  progress,  a  decline  in  demand  for  durable  goods,  slower 
growth  and  a  deter1oration  in  international  competitiveness. 
On  the other  hand,  in  the  case  of  financing  based  on  value  ad-
ded  tax  ,  the possibilities for  refunding  this  tax  would  favour  exports, 
wh1le  1mports  would  have  to bear  additional  costs.  Overall  effects 
cannot  be  assessed  on  the  basis of  these  isolated factors.  They  will 
be  determined  in  each  country  primarily  by  the  sum  total of  all effects 
on  the  sectors  concerned,  and  for  the  Community,  by  the  aggregation of 
national  trends.  The  Lack  of  data,  however,  remains  a  major  problem. 
d.  Adapting  the  solution to  the  size of  the  business 
Some  people  also suggest  that  the  burden  of  contributions  on 
small  businesses  should  be  reduced,  since  they  have  in  the  past  played 
a  major  part  in  expanding  employment.  There  are  a  number  of  ways  in 
which  this  could  be  done,  with  as  many  different  results.  But  whatever 
solution is adopted,  the  Loss  of  revenue  entailed would  have  to  be  made 
up  somehow.  In  other  words,  either all contributions  would  have  to  be  redu-
ced  across  the  board,  or  contributions  paid  by  others- i.e.  social  security 
contributions or  taxes  - increased,  with  all  the  nagative  implications 
that  this  might  have. 
e.  Financial  stability 
The  financial  stability of  the  social  security  schem~is another  crucial 
factor.  Before  suggesting  reforms  it is  important  to  know  how  the different 
systems  of  contribution-based  financing  can  be  restored  to  financial  sta-
bility, both  in  times  of  ftuctuating  economic  tr~nds  and  in  times  of  ~rowth  • 
. I. 
(1)  See  footnote  1,  page  6. - 8  -
It  should,  however,  also be  possible  in  future  to  increase 
contribution  rates  to  cope  with  the  increasing demands  on  the  scheme  due  to 
demographic  trends,  without  causing  excessive disruption  in economic 
structures.  The  best  guarantee  for  this  would  appear  to  be  to establish 
the  broadest  possible  tax  or  contribution  base  to enable  the  Lowest  rates 
to be  changed.  It  should  be  added  that  Low  Levels  of  contribution or 
taxation also  reduce  the  Likelihood of  fraud. 
f.  Other  aspects 
There  are  a  number  of  other  aspects  which  should  be  taken  into 
account  to  enable  a  meaningful  comparison  to be  made  between  existing 
financing  systems  and  possible alternatives,  even  if they are perhaps 
not  as  important  a  factor  as  employment. 
The  problem  of  fraud  is another  argument  against  financing  social 
security ent1rely  from  the  general  budget.  Experience  shows  that  Levies 
meet  less  opposition  when  the  relationship  between  contribution and 
benefit  is  as  close  as  possible - in other  words,  when  individual  people 
see  where  their money  is going.  This  is  not  usually  the  case  with  taxes. 
The  effects on  the  redistribution of  income  would  also  hamper 
reforms.  In  this  respect,  the  consequences  would  vary  depending  on 
whether  we  were  dealing  with  financing  from  direct  taxation or  indirect 
taxation,  from  earnings-related contributions  or  contributions  linked  to 
value  added.  Reliable data  on  these  aspects  are  few  and  far  between. 
Finally,  the  effects of  a  reform  of  the  financing  system  at  Community 
level.  At  the  moment  there  are  considerable differences  between  the 
Member  States.  If  we  take  the  current  situation as  our  base  line 
then  any  change,  depending  on  its nature  and  the  number  of  countries 
involved,  will  affect  intra-Community  trade.  This  is  clearly demonstrated 
by  the  example  of  financing  from  indirect  taxation  <with  the possibility 
of  refunding  on  exports)  in  comparison  with  direct  taxation  <no  scope 
for  refunding). 
g.  Capitalisation or  redistribution 
To  cope  with  the  rise  in expenditure  caused  by  changes  in  the 
population structure,  particularly as  regards  pension  schemes,  there  is 
a  growing  interest  in  funding  as  an  alternative to  the  current  system 
of  financing from  current  income.  Schemes  based  on  funding  do  in  fact 
seem  to be  less  sensitive to demographic  fluctuations. 
. I. - 9  -
At  the  moment  most  pension  schemes  in  the  Member  States  are 
current-income  schemes.  Although  it has  been  possible  to maintain  their 
financial  equilibrium  in  spite of  the  unfavourable  economic  climate  in 
recent  years,  the  future  looks  less  certain.  There  are  two  main  reasons 
for  this  :  the  fact  that  these schemes  have  reached  maturity,  an~ the 
demographic  ageing  factor.  Even  if the  conjunction of  these  two.factors 
will  not  produce  its maximum  effect  until after the  year  2000- as 
economists  and  demographers  believe - the  fact  remains  that  the effecti-
veness  of  these schemes  will  decline gradually,  particularly those  with 
a  relatively narrow  demographic  base. 
A significant  drop  in  unemployment  would  slow  down  this  development 
but  would  not  prevent  it. 
It  is therefore  reasonable  to ask  whether  an  element  of  funding 
should  not  be  introduced gradually.  Current schemes  are  not  in  fact 
intended  to provide  the  elderly with  their  sole  source  of  revenue.  Many 
people  save  up  for  retirement,  during  their working  life, and  in  the 
future  this  may  have  to  play  a  more  important  part.  This  raises  th.e' 
question  as  to whether  savings  should  be  individual  or  collective;~ 
which,  in turn,  raises  the question of  how  such  savings  shouldtie  managed. 
~~/ 
An  answer  to  the  development  of  long-term  investment',.impl ied  by 
this  new  line of  thought  might  be  found  in  the  collective' management 
and  control  of  individual  savings,  which  would  amount,.to  risk- sharing 
as  far  as  the  savers  are  concerned.  Also,  individual  savings  under 
this  form  of  management  could  benefit  from  an  additional  guarantee  if 
they  were  converted  into  ECUs.  The  resulting effect of  lightening 
the  burden  of  pensions,  however,  would  only  be  felt  in  the  long-term. 
In  the  transitional  stage,  which  is  bound  to be  a  long  one,  there would 
be  additional  costs.  Hence  the  urgent  need  to take  a  close  look  at 
this  problem. 
II.  DEMOGRAPHIC  PROBLEMS  (1) 
Demographic  data  and  hypotheses  are  of  considerable  importance 
to political,  economic  and  social  decision-makers.  In  view  of  the  wide 
range  of  medium  - and  particularly  long-term  - consequences,  they  can 
no  longer  ignore  the  current  population structure. 
. I. 
(1)  See  attached  table. - 10  -
Since  1964  fertility  has  been  declining  in all Member  States  and  there 
are  no  signs  indicating  whe~e~ or  when,  we  shall  return  to  the  average 
fertility  rate of  2.1  children  per  woman,  which  would  only  take  care  of 
the quantitative  renewal  of  the  population  (Ireland  is the only  exception, 
with  a  fertility  rate  of  2.95  in  1982).  The  situation  is  not  Limited  to 
Europe  :  the  declining birthrate was  first  observed  in  the  United  States 
in  the  1960s,  and  subsequently  in  Japan.  We  are  therefore dealing  with 
a  phenomenon  affecting all  developed  countries,  for  which  there  is  no 
historical  precedent. 
"But  the  quasi  stagnating  population  figures .in  Europe  (1)  - in 
contrast  to  those  in  other  areas,  such  as  Asia,  Africa,  South  America  - are 
due  to a  variety of  causes,  i.e.  a  drastic  drop  in fertility,  a  fall-off 
in  immigration  and  a  gradual  slowing  down  of  the  rate at  which  mortality 
is declining.  Although  this  demographic  decline  affects all  European 
countries,  there  are  considerable  differences  in population  growth  rates 
(negative  in  the  case  of  the  Federal  Republic,  more  or  less  zero  for  five 
countries,  positive for  others,  and  even  highly  positive  in  the  case  of 
Ireland). 
If  current  trends  are  maintained,  the  population  of  the  Community 
will  cease  to  grow  in  about  15  years  time  and  then  begin  to decline  slowly. 
Unless  the  fertility  rate  suddenly  picks  up- and  at  the  moment  nothing 
suggests  that  this will  happen- or  immigration  takes  off  again,  which 
is  not  part  of  any  Member  State•s  current  policy,  the  ageing  of  the 
population- i.e.  the  increase  in  the  proportion  of  old people  in  the 
total- will  continue  slowly  for  another  20  years  and  accelerate sharply 
from  2005-2010  onward. 
For  the  active population,  the effect  of  this  ageing  process  is 
Likely  to  manifest  itself much  earlier.  Hitherto it  has  been  slowed 
down  by  two  opposite  trends  :  the  increased activity among  young  women 
and  the  rapid  decline  in  activity  rates after 55. 
What  are  the  Likely  consequences  of  the  current  hypothesis  that  the 
Low  fertility  rate will  continue  and  will  not  be  offset  by  a  high 
immigration  rate  ?  (2) 
.I. 
(1)  The  population of  the  twelve  Member  States  stood at  321  million  in mid 
1984  (6.7%  world  population)  and  will  reac~ 329  million  in  2000,  an 
increasem  2.6%  composed  to  1984.  World  population will  increase  by 
28.6%during  the  same  period  (6  127  million  in  2000). 
(2)  See  also  ESC  report  of  June  1985  on  the  demographic  situation;  and 
work  done  by  the  OECD  working  party on  social  policies  in  1984  and  1985  on 
ageing  populations. - 11  -
The  short-term  consequences  (i.e.  up  to 1990)  can,  generally  speaking, 
be  considered  as  positive, at  Least  with  regard  to  the  visible part  of 
the  changes  caused by  a  transition to  Low  fertility.  In  terms  of  public 
finance  it means  that  expenditure  on  young  people  will  be  reduced, 
savings  can  be  made  on  social  security  because  less  money  is  required  for 
health  care  related  to maternity  and  infancy,  family  benefits  will  be 
reduced,  etc.  On  the  other  hand,  the  increase  in  the  number  of  persons 
over  75  will  mean  an  increase  in  health  expenditure. 
The  economic  effect  of  these demographic  changes,  however,  looks 
different.  In  addition  to  certain elements  which  may  be  regarded  as 
certain,  both  positive  and  negative,  there are  a  number  which  are  more 
doubtful  or  at  least  subject  to  controversy.  The  "certain" elements  are 
the  following  :  the  growth,  and  subsequently decline,  of  the  potential 
working  population  towards  1990  (which  could  be  offset  by  a  growth  in 
activity  among  women>;  negative sectoral  repercussions  (e.g.  a  fall-off 
in  demand  relating to the  needs  of  younger  generations,  particularly  in  consu-
mer  goods,  school  equipment,  and  housing).  Other  aspects  are  less  certain 
changes  in  the  level  and  structure of  consumption  <1>  which  are  likely 
to  cause  significant  shifts  in  demand  from  one  sector  to another;  changes 
in  the  volume  and  quality of  savings  and  investment. 
The  long-term  consequences  of  a  continuing  low  fertility  rate will 
be  two-fold  :  economic  and  political.  Both  imply  an  ageing  population  in  the 
Community  <loss  of  manpower  potential  and  security of  young  people  in  the 
labour  force;  ageing  increase  in  the  aged;  threat  to  competitiveness  with 
the political  consequences  (balance  between  rich  and  poor  countries)  which 
would  result.  The  ageing  of  the  working  population,  in  particular,  will 
lead  to a  heavier  burden  on  the  economy,  especially  in  terms,  of  social 
charges.  This  will  produce  strains as  regards  the  cost  of  labour, 
a  decline  in geographical  and  vocational  mobility  and  a  sharp  drop  in 
the  rate of  which  the  active  population  is  renewed. 
Given  these  conditions  we  cannot  exclude  - in  a  more  distant  future  -
the  need  for  new  imports  of  immigrant  labour;  except  that  this  time  round 
it will  be  a  slow  migration  in  contrast  to  the  rapid  influx  of  the  1960s. 
Such  forms  of  modulated  immigration  would  enable  us  to prevent  conflict 
situations and  absorb  immigrants  into  European  societies  without  drastic 
problems.  These  demographic  factors~  combined  with  a  number  of  economic 
factors,  could  also be  a  threat  to  the  Community's  international  competiti-
veness.  Nor  should  we  disregard  the political  consequences  of  the  sudden 
and  major  redistribution of  the  world  population  in  the  decades  to  come 
if current  demographic  trends  continue.  <The  EEC  of  twelve  in 1984  repre-
sents 6.2% of  the  world  population,  this will  h~ve declined  to  5.4%  by 
the  year  2000>.  · 
0 
.I. 
(1)  This  will  result  both  from  a  pause  in  the  increase  in the  number  of 
inhabitants  and  from  a  transformation in  the  age  pyramid  and  will 
affect  notably  the  construction  sector  and  public  investment  (schools, 
hospitals,  housing  equipment  and  other  infrastructure)  as  also needs 
of  specific age  groups  <health,  leisure,  tourism,  etc.). - 12  -
Demographic  changes  are  slow  and  leave  ample  time  for  appropriate 
measures,  but  since  they  do  not  clearly manifest  themselves  in  the  short-
term  they  are  also easily overlooked.  It  is  their  long-term effect 
which  is  crucial  for  the  future  of  the  societies  concerned.  Although 
in  densely  populated  European  countries  the  decline  in populations  has 
for  years  been  seen  as  ecologically beneficial,  we  should  now  become 
aware  of  the possible  long-term  drawbacks.  The  direct  effects of  an 
ageing  population  on  social  charges  and  taxes  is  becoming  increasingly 
clear,  but  the  way  in  which  it will  affect  our  ability to master  the 
newer  technologies  or  remain  in  the  forefront  in  international 
competition  and  external  markets  should  not  be  ignored,  since  this  may 
well  be  even  more  decisive  in  the  long-term. 
In  spite of  the  relative  convergence  of  demographic  trends  in  the 
Member  States,  the  moment  and  intensity of  impact  of  the  consequences 
of  continuing  low  fertility will  depend  on  the  initial state of  the  age 
pyramid.  The  degree  of  urgency  of  national  situations  - and  therefore 
the  need  for  action  on  the  part  of  the  authorities  - varies  from  one 
Member  State to  another. 
In  these  circumstances,  the  Commission's  role  should  be  to 
encourage  a  wide-ranging  debate  on  the  current  demographic  situation and 
the  consequences  it might  have  in  the  medium- and  long-term:  in  the 
first  instance  for  schemes  of  social  protection  (in the  health  field  and  for 
old  age  pensions). 
III.  MARGINALISATION 
Better  known  as  the  problem  of  the  "new  poor",  this  phenomenon  -
which  has  spread  as  a  result  of  slow  growth  and  labour  market  trends  caused 
by  industrial  restructuring  - takes  a  number  of  different  forms. 
For  the  purpose of  this  Communication  (1)  we  shall  restrict ourselves 
to  persons  who  are  not  - or  inadequately  - covered  by  existing  social 
protection  schemes  <social  security  and  assistance).  Budgetary  restrictions 
often  lead public  authorities  to exclude  young  unemployed  persons,  at 
national  or  Local  level,  from  social  protection  (particularly  first-time 
applicants)  or  to restrict  the duration  or  level  of  entitlement  for  other 
categories  of  unemployed  persons  <this  applies  in  particular  to  the 
long-term  unemployed). 
. I. 
(1)  The  Commission  will  at  any  rate  have  to  expand  its activities  in 
this  area  in  years  to  come.  Its work  progral!llle  for  1986  takes  this 
into  account. - 13  -
The  numbers  of  these  job-seekers  is growing  in all  Member  States 
as  a  result  of  changes  in  the  labour  market  and  in  the  quality of 
employment.  The  young  are  facing  additional  complications  caused 
by  the demographic  expansion  of  the  1950s  and  early sixties.  Another 
hard-hit  category  is  that  of  working  people  aged  over  SO, 
who  are  the  first  to  lose  their  jobs  as  a  result  of  industrial 
restructuring. 
For  them  the possibility  of  finding  reasonably  secure  employment 
is often  remote.  They  are  liable to end  up  without  (adequate)  income  and. 
are  threatened  with  more  or  less  long-term  social  isolation.  Public 
assistance  schemes,  which  are  facing  increasing  or  insurmountable  finan-
cial difficulties, are  not  - or  no  longer  - in  a  position  to  take over 
where  social  security  schemes  leave  off.  The  scale of  this  problem  has 
prompted  the  public  authorities  to  take  specific  transitional  measures. 
In  addition  to  employment  problems,  new  poverty  is  also  caused  by 
the  increasing  instability of  the  family  situation.  The  number  of  divor-
ces,  separations  and  cases  of  cohabitation  is growing.  In  the  absence 
of  individual  rights,  social protection,  which  is  based  on  the  rights 
enjoyed  by  the  spouse,  is threatened  when  the  marriage  breaks  down. 
The  rights of  the  cohabiting  partner  are  often  limited.  A spouse  with 
no  occupational  record  not  only  risks  loss  of  income,  but  also  loss  of 
entitlement  to  health  care  and  old  age  or  survivors•  pensions  rights. 
In  such  situations the  children also suffer. 
Large  groups  of  beneficiaries,  moreover,  are  insufficiently aware  of  their 
rights,  how  to excercise  them,  and  how  to get  help  in their dealing  with 
the  appropriate  authorities.  These  people  tend  to  be  at  the  bottom  of  the 
social  and  educational  scale.  Social  security bodies  should  make  a  special 
effort on  behalf  of  these  categories,  to enable  them  to  make  full  use  of 
the  entitle~ent which  is theirs  by  rights. 
IV.  COMMISSION  PROPOSALS 
The  Commission,  on  the  basis of  the  analysis  made  in  chapters I, II 
and  III, proposes  a  range  of  actions  for  each  specific  group  of  problems 
in  hand.  The  objectives of  these  actions  vary.  As  far  as  financing  is 
concerned  the  aim  is  to  concentrate  the  debate  and  deal  with  the 
problem  in  greater depth;  with  regard  to  demography  or  new  poverty,  the 
objective  is to  launch  a  debate  at  Community-level.  These  proposals  should 
all  be  implemented  during  the.mandate  6f  the  p~esent Commission • 
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1)  Financing 
- Although  it is  extremely difficult  in  the  short  term  to  reduce 
the  current  level  of  compulsory  social  charges,  the  relative proportions 
in  which  these  charges  are  levied  can  always  be  changed,both with  regard 
to  industry  and  between  industry and  households. 
For  this  purpose  the  Commission  will,  within  the  next  two  years, 
draw  up  an  inventory of all  solutions currently under  discussion as  well 
as  those  in  force.  This  also  implies  an  evaluation of  the objectives 
to  be  achieved.  The  effects  on  employment  obviously  come  first;  however, 
the  consequences,  such  as  the  redistribution of  incomes  and  the  financial 
stability of  the  social  securityscheme  must  also  be  taken  into  account. 
- The  first  steps  have  already  been  taken <on  the  basis  of  the  study 
mentioned  on  page  six  as  well  as  other  work  currently  in  progress).  The 
Commission  will  also  refer  to  a  considerable  amount  of  preparatory work 
which  is  being  done  in  the  Member  States,  the  results  of  which  need  to be 
compared  and  discussed,  particularly where  conclusions  tend  to diverge. 
This  applies  above  all  to  the  few  practical  experiments  so  far  undertaken 
in  this  field  <e.g.  the  MARIBEL  scheme  in  Belgium). 
The  crucial  step,  however,  as  far  as  the  Commission  is  concerned, 
is  to bring  these  results  together at  Community  level.  The  close  economic 
links  between  the  Member  States  and  with  third  countries  should  be  taken 
into account.  This  is  not  a  matter  of  simply  adding  up  the  effects at  na-
tional  level.  Certain positive or  negative  effects  in  national  terms  may  well 
be  cancelled out  by  aggregating  them  at  Community  Level.  Positive effects 
on  employment  in one  country  may  well  lead  to  job  Losses  in  other  countries. 
- However,  the  economic  effect  of  changes  in  methods  of  financing  in 
one,  several,  or all  Member  States  can  only  be  quantified on  the  basis  of 
extensive  simulation.  This  requires  extremely  detailed  knowledge  of  the 
economic  data  relating  to  individual  Member  States,  which  are  not  always 
available.  The  Commission  must  therefore  gather  the  necessary  information 
in  as  many  countries  as  possible  and  build  up  the  necessary  database  for  an 
econometric  model  to obtain quantitative  information at  Community  Level. 
- Finally, the  Commission  will  study  the  trend  towards  the  partial or 
total  funding  of  old-age  pension  schemes  in  the  Community,  and  examine  possible 
alternatives  to  the  present  pay-as-you-go  systems,  as  well  as  their medium-
and  long-term  implications. 
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2)  Demography 
Bearing  in mind  the  number  of  recommendations  made  in  the  report 
adopted  by  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee  <1>,  the  Commission 
proposes  : 
•  to draw  up,  with  assistance of  the  Member  States,  an 
inventory of  family  policy measures  and  provisions  in 
effect or  envisaged  by  the  former; 
•  to compare  these policies, 
and,  on  the  basis of  the  result, 
•  to organise  concertation at  the  level  of  senior national 
officials  responsible  for  these policies,  as  is already 
the  case  in  the  field of  social  protection; 
•  to undertake  a  programme  of  studies  on  long-term  population 
trends  and  their  consequences. 
In  this  context  the  outlook  for  pension schemes  in  the 
medium- and  long-term  will  receive  special  attention  <2>; 
•  to  launch  information  campaigns  to make  public  opinion aware 
of  the  various  aspects of  current  population  trends  and  their 
economic  and  social  impact. 
3)  Marginalisation 
To  get  a  clearer view  of  this  phenomenon  and  the  various  ways 
of dealing with  it which  are  already  taking  share  in  certain areas, 
the  Commission  proposes 
•  to draw  up  - with  the  help  of  the  Member  States  - an  inven-
tory of  the  various  measures  already  taken  or  planned  in 
this field,  and  to gather quantitative data  currently 
available on  the  population  categories  concerned; 
•  to  complement  this  information  by  various  kinds  of  studies 
and  research  particularly statistical studies on  aspects 
hitherto little known; 
.I. 
(1)  ESC  report  on  the  demographic  situation,  June  1985 
(2)  Taking  care to avoid  overlap with  work  and  activities of  a  similar 
nature  by  other  international  organizations  such  as  the  Council  of 
Europe  and  the  OECD.  This  study  will  take account  of  real  pensions, 
financing  problems  and  the question of  retirement  age. - 16  -
.  to  examine,  on  the  basis  this  inventory,  primarily  with 
the  Member  States,  changes  that  can  or  should  be  made  in 
social  security  and  public  assistance  Legislation  to  cope 
with  these  new  social  phenomena.  In  this  context.various 
projects or  proposals  designed  to  introduce  a  m1n1mum 
social  income  as  a  way  of  combating  poverty  will  receive 
particular attention. 
0 
0  0 
V.  FINAL  COMMENTS 
The  above  analysis  clearly demonstrates  the  considerable  degree  of 
interdependence  that  exists  between  the  problems  studied  in  this document. 
For  society  to  take  charge,  through  its social  protection schemes 
of  the  social  risks  arising  from  economic  changes  resulting  from  the 
restructuring of  the  Labour  market  (unemployment  and  social  exclusion) 
or  the  consequences  of  the  ageing  of  the  population  {in  terms  of  expenditure 
on  health care  for  the  elderly  and  aged,  pensions  and  new  services for  this 
category)  would  inevitably  Lead  to  a  considerable  increase  in  compulsory 
social  charges. 
The  question  that  arises  is  whether  this  new  situation  would  be 
compatible  with  economic  policies  generally  followed  so  far. 
A preliminary  answer  can  be  found  in  an  OECD  study,  published  in 
1985  (1),  according  to  which  the  possibilities for  extending  the  scope  of 
social  intervention are minimal or non-existent  up  to  the  end  of  the 
1980s;  the  study  recognizes,  however,  that  overall  social  expenditure 
could at  least  keep  up  with  real  economic  growth. 
Beyond  that  period,  however,  the  consequences  of  structural  change, 
both  economic  and  social, particularly as  regards  social  protection 
schemes,  must  be  dealt  with  in one  way  or  another. 
. I . 
(1)  Social  Expenditure  1960-1990 - 17  -
Would  it not,  therefore,  be  appropriate  for  the  Member  States to 
proceed  forthwith  with  a  discussion at  Community  level  on  the objectives 
to be  fixed  for  social  protection schemes  beyond  the  1990s  ?  The  pur-
pose  of  this initiative would  be  to obviate the danger  that  Member  States, 
within the framework  of  the  completion of  the  internal market,  might  intro-
duce  social measures  which  would  give  them  a  competitive  edge  against 
other member  countries  - in other words,  to  prevent  "social dumping". 
This  quest  for  the  convergence  of  Long-term  objectives would  also 
overcome  at  Least  part  of  the opposition to  the  idea of  progress  towards 
an  approximation  of social  protection schemes  in the  Community  which 
exists  in the  current  economic  climate. 
This  Communication,  by  highlighting  a  number  of  factors  of  change 
and  bringing  them  to  the attention of  the Member  States - is intended  to 
serve as  a  guideline for  the  necessary discussion on  the future of  social 
security schemes. 
• 
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OF  22  JUNE  1984 
ANNEX  1 
concerning  a  Community  medium-term  social  action programme 
{84/C  175/01) 
Social  protection and  demographic  trends 
(EXTRACTS) 
Social  protection  systems  are  an  important 
feature  of  the  social  cohesion of  the  Community  countries.  Furthermore,  the 
security thus  obtained  is the  counterpart  of  the  necessary mobility of  jobs 
in the  face  of  technological  change  and  competition. 
Without  this  implying  any  harmonization 
objective,  adjustments  should,  however,  be  envisaged  in  order to  consolidate 
achievements  and  increase  the  efficiency of  national  systems.  They  would  also 
contribute to  strengthening the  competitiveness  of  European  economies  in  the 
face  of  international  competition.  The  Commission  will  have  to  continue  to ensure 
that  these adjustments  do  not  become  a  stake  in  the  competition  between  European 
economies. 
While  taking  institutional differences  into 
account,  the  Commission  is  requested  to endeavour  to  identify better the  impact 
of  social  security payments  on  the  competitiveness  of  undertakings,  employment 
and  the  standard of  living of  households  in  the  economic  context  as  a  whole. 
At  the  end  of  this task,  it will  report  back  to the  Council. 
The  ministers  responsible  are  invited to examine 
the  means  employed  to  control  trends  in  health  expenditure  on  the  basis  of  a 
periodical  report  from  the  Commission.  The  latter will  examine  with  the  Member 
States the possibilities for  cooperation  in  the  field of  health. 
. I. 
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The  Council  will  hold  a  regular  exchange 
of  information on  the  development  of  family  policy and  the  effects of 
population  trends  as  well  as  the  consequences  of  ageing.  The  Commission  is 
requested  to  conduct  studies to this end. 
LO 11 
ANNEX  2  ANNEXE  2 
Tableau  1/Table  1 
D~penses de  protection sociale  en  X du  P.I.a. 
Social  security expenditure as  X of  G.D.P.  (1) 
B  OK  D  FR  IRL  IT  L  NL  UK 
1983  31,9  30,2  28,9  28,8  24,6  27,3  29,3  34,0  23,7 
)  ESPAGNE  18,5 
(2)  (  PORTUGAL  12,6 
)  GRECE  20,2 
Tableau  2 /Table  2 
Part  (en  %  du  total  des  prestations de  protection sociale> 
representee  par  les  fonctions  suivantes  (1) 
Proportion  Cas  % of  total  social  security benefits>  of  following  functions 
I 
8 
Sante  21,9 
Health 
Vieillesse  27,0 
Old  Age 
Famille  9,9 
Family 
Chom,ge  14,2 
Unemploy-
ment 
Aut res  27,0 
.  fonct·i ons 
O~her 
functions 
100  , 
)  ESPAGNE 
(2) 
DK  D  FR  IRL  IT  L  NL  UK 
23,5  27,0  24,7  29,0  22,5  22,8  25,6  20,3 
34,3  29,8  34,0  24,9  34,7  26,7  27,0  40,6 
9,4  6,5  9,6  9,4  6,9  7,6  8,1  10,6 
13,7  7,1  9,8  13,1  3,2  3,1  12,7  10,1 
19,1  29,6  21,9  23,6  32,7  39,8  26,6  18,4 
• 
100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Sante  :  29- Vieillesse  :  42- Famille  :  0,02- Chomage  :  15-
Autres  :  9,0. 
Sante  :  18,7- Vieillesse  :  70,3- Famille  :  3,3- Chomage  2,7-
Autres  :  5,5. 
(1)  Donn~es fournies  par  l'O.S.C.E. 
(2)  Donnees  nationales. 






100 ANNEX  3 
Total population, birth and death rates, population projections 
Population,  Birth  Death 
Country  1984  rate  rate 
(1  000)  1984 (2)  1984 (2) 
FR  of Germany  61  175  9.5  11.3 
France  54947  13.8  9.9 
Italy  57005  10.3  9.3 
The Netherlands  14424  12.1  8.3 
Belgium  9855  11.8  11.2 
Luxembourg  366  11.5  11. 1 
United Kingdom  56488  12.9  11.4 
Ireland  3535  18.2  9.1 
Denmark  5112  10.1  11.2 
Greece  9896  12.7  8.9 
EUR  10  272 803  11.7  10.4 
Spain  38387  12.5  7.7 
Portugal  10089  14.2  9.6 
EUR  12  321 279  11.9  10.3 
USSR  275000  19.6  10.8 
USA  236 681  15.7  8.7 
Japan  120018  12.2  6.2 
World  4 763000  27.3  10.6 
(1)  National projection, where published. Otherwise UN  1981-based (medium) projection. 
(2)  1983 for Spain,  USSR,  Japan. 
Source  :  EUROSTAT 
Population projection (1) 
(1 000) 
1990  I 
2000 
. 
60664  59 198 
56089  57 882 
57 258  57 925 
14 725  15 147 
9747  9630 
370  373 
56 724  57684 
3 765  4 123 
5099  5 114 
9880  10435 
274 321  277 691 
39457  40975 
10 518  11 012 
324296  329 678 
291 309  314 818 
248017  268 079 
122 652  127 683 
5248000  6127 000 
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ANNEXE  3 
Tableau  4 
POPULATION  PROJECTION 
PR6illfi6N-6ETAP5POLATION  .. 
<Total  persons  - Total  des  personnes) 
BUNDESREPUBLIK  DEUTSCHLAND 
AGE  1.1.1985  1.1.1990  1.1.2000 
0  - 14  9  370,4  8  964,2  8  848,0 
15  - 44  27  300,4  26  277,2  24  055,8 
45  - 64  15  378,5  15  968,4  16  173,3 
65  +  8  977 ,a  9  454,9  10  121,3 
TOTAL  61  026,3  60  664,7  59  198,4 
FRANCE 
AGE  1.1.1985  1.1.1990  1.1.2000 
0  - 14  11  744,3  11  226,9  10  995,1 
15  - 44  24  137,1  25  302,0  24  220,9 
45  - 64  12  125,0  11  745,0  . 13  552,5 
65  +  7 056,6  ~ 815,3  9  113,0 
TOTAL  55  063,0  56  089,2  57  881,5 
IT ALIA 
AGE  1.1.1986  1 . 1 • 1991  1 . 1 . 2001 
0  - 14  11  054  10  346  10  839 
15  - 44  24  406  25  157  23  885 
45  - 64  13  941  13  626  14  058 
65  +  7  563  8  202  9  189 
TOTAL  56  964  . 57  331  57  966 
NEDERLAND 
AGE  1.1.1985  1.1.1990  1.1.2000 
I  0  - 14  2  850,8  I  2  621,3  2  590,4 
I  15  - 44  6  937,6  I  7  105,3  6  532,0 
I  45  - 64  2  935,7  I  3  077,8  3  833,4 
I  65  +  1  730,0  I  1  920,1  2  191,4 
I  I 
I  TOTAL  14  454,2  I  14  724,6  15  147,1 - 2  -
BELGIE/BELGIQUE 
-r-------ru;r ---- 1  31.12  .1~~~  ,- 31 •  1  ~ •  P) c,a  :s1.12. 2ocm  I 
0  - 14  1  844,1  1  782,5  1  762,9 
15  - 44  4  274,7  4  262,0  3  854,2 
45  - 64  2  322,8  2  223,4  2  376,2 
65  +  1  361,9  1  466,6  1  621,9 
TOTAL  9  803,5  9  733,5  9  615,2 
LUXEMBOURG 
AGE  1.1.1985  1.1.1990  1.1.2000 
0  - 14  64,9  67,5  70,7 
15  - 44  165,9  165,1  155,4 
45  - 64  88,7  90,6  95,7 
65  +  46,4  46,8  51,7 
TOTAL  365,9  370,0  373,5 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
AGE  30.6.1983  30.6.1990  30.6.2000 
0  - 14  11  170  10  774  11  840 
15  - 44  24  239  24  846  23  577 
45  - 64  12  550  12  238  13  504 
65  +  8  419  8  865  8  761 
TOTAL  56  377  56  724  57  684 
IRELAND 
AGE  15.4.1981  15.4.1984  15.4.1991 
0  - 14  1  043,4  1  039,9  966,9 
15  - 44  1  440,3  1  569,8  1  666,8 
45  - 64  590,5  593,2  624,4 
65  +  368,9  381,0  387,8 
TOTAL  3  443,4  3  583,9  3  645,9 '15 
- 3  -
DANMARK 
AGE  1.1.1985  1.1.1990  1.1.  2000 
0  - 14  950,7  864,8  893,4 
15  - 44  2  304,6  2  300,5  2  092,1 
45  - 64  1  089,7  1  134,8  1  333,9 
65  +  766,1  798,7  794,6 
TOTAL  5  111,1  5  098,8  5  114,0 
GREECE 
AGE  30.6.1985  30.6.1990  30.6.2000 
0  - 14  2  147,0  2  245,5  2  414,4 
15  - 44  3  919,0  4  075,2  4  266,8 
45  - 64  2  316,0  2  305,7  2  247,0 
65  +  1  208,7  1  253,6  1  506,5 
TOTAL  9  590,7  9  880,0  10 434,7 
PORTUGAL 
AGE  1.1.1986  1 . 1 . 1991  1.1.2001 
0  - 14  2  549,5  2  510,3  2  365,7 
15  - 44  4  552,1  4  802,3  4  997,9 
45  - 64  2  100,5  2  094,6  2  328,8 
65  +  1  082,0  1  169,6  1  361,0 
TOTAL  10  284,1  10  576,8  11  053,4 
ESPANA 
AGE  1.3.1986(1)  1.3.1991(1)  1. 3. 2001 
0  - 14  8  926,4  8  229,4  7  987,0 
15  - 44  16  696,2  17  6  78,1  18  205,6 
45  - 64  8  437,6  8  499,5  8  720,5 
65  +  4  686,2  5  227,8  6  204,3 
TOTAL  38  746,4  39  634,8  41  117,4 
(1)  Including  population  of  Ceuta  and  Melilla 
Y compris  La  population de  Ceuta  et  Melilla 
Source :  EUROSTAT 